Abstract-The trust data is critical to the trust model of P2P system. In this paper we present an efficient certificateless cryptography scheme and propose a protocol which provides the ability for sharing trust data securely. The protocol avoids the escrow problem identity-based cryptosystem and the secure delivery of private keys. The security of scheme is based on some underlying problems closely related to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem are computationally hard. It tolerates the Type I and Type II adversary. The proof of security is presented in the random oracle model. Through security discussion, we show that my secure protocol is extremely secure when encounter a variety of possible attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an emerging model of communication and computation, peer-to-peer (P2P) networking has recently gained significant acceptance. Millions of users share huge amounts of resources by forming an abstract, logical network called an overlay network. Peer-to-peer networks have many benefits over standard client-server approaches to data distribution, including increased robustness, scalability, and diversity of available data. There are many good P2P applications, such as Napster, Gnutella, KaZaa, eDonkey, BitTorrent, Tapestry, Chord, CAN, Pastry, SETI@home, Avaki, Popular Power, JXTA, Magi, Groove, etc. However, the open and anonymous nature of these networks raises several issues. Firstly, the complete lack of accountability for the content a peer puts on the network opens the doors to abuse of these networks by malicious and irresponsible peers. The other is that P2P communities are often established dynamically by peers that are unrelated and unknown to one another. In order to complete the transaction quickly and securely, peers should select a secure, powerful and steady partner, which is however difficult to accomplish in P2P network, since peers cannot know the status of the others.
To resolve afore mentioned issues, one effective way is developing strategies for establishing community-based trust through reputation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Reputation system provides a way for building trust through social control without trusted third parties. It can help a peer to select partner with higher reputation when he performs a transaction.
Reputation-based trust model can effectively improve performance of P2P networks. A fair amount of work has been done in the area of computing reputation-based trust ratings. However, only few papers discussed the issue of developing secure underlying protocols to distribute and access the trust ratings in the overlay network.
The purpose of designing an anonymous authentication protocol in P2P systems is motivated by the problem how to securely propagate the peers' trust data? The accuracy and validity of trust model most rely on the quality of trust data, so the secure access of trust data is critical to the trust model. However the mechanisms of message forwarding in the P2P network are that a message reaches the desired peer after going through a number of other peers in the network. Since anybody can modify the information in the message, the security of trust data can not be insured.
PKI-based secure protocol may be employed to implement secure access of trust data. But the main difficulty in developing secure systems based on public key cryptography is the deployment and management of infrastructures to support the authenticity of public keys. In traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), this is achieved in the form of certificates issued by a trusted certification authority (CA), which induces the problem of certificates management. In [11, 12] , Identity-based public key cryptography (IBPKC) was proposed to solve this problem, since the direct derivation of public keys in IB-PKC eliminates the need for certificates.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [13] proposed a scheme called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) which is intermediate between identity-based [10, 11] and traditional PKI-supported cryptography. The concept was introduced to suppress the inherent keyescrow property of identity-based cryptosystems (ID-PKC) without losing their most attractive advantage which is the absence of digital certificates and their important management overhead.
In this paper we present a secure protocol for maintaining and accessing trust rating information. The protocol uses CL-PKC schemes to provide security and is resistant to various attacks. One of difficulties of deploying CL-PKC in the P2P network is how to select KGC. But in the hybrid P2P network, we can let the server act as KGC. CL-PKC can avoid both the problem of certificates management and escrow problem. In the original construction of CL-PKE in [13, 14, 15] , the KGC must ensure that the partial key is delivered securely to the correct entity, while this requirement is canceled in our scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related works including secure protocol in the trust management schemes, CL-PKC and anonymous P2P protocols. We review the formal definition and adversarial model of CLE schemes in section 3. Our certificateless public key cryptography scheme is proposed in section 4. Section 5 presents secure protocol for sharing trust data. We give the security discuss in section 6, and conclude this work in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK

A. The secure scheme in the trust model
Very few papers attend to the secure access of trust data. The following are the basic ideas of secure algorithm of EigenRep [10] :  The current trust value of a peer must not be computed by and reside at the peer itself, where it can easily become subject to manipulation.  It will be in the interest of malicious peers to return wrong results when they are supposed to compute any peer's trust value. Therefore, the trust value of one peer in the network will be computed by more than one other peer. In other words the security of EigenRep just relates to the security of trust computing.
TrustMe [9] is a secure and anonymous underlying protocol for trust management, which is based on the public key cryptography. It was the bootstrap server' responsibility for selecting THA-peers (peers which hold the trust value for a particular peer). This kind of approach suffers from following shortcomings:  How to choose the bootstrap server is a very difficult task to complete.  The security of system relied on the bootstrap server.  No discussing data synchronization between multiple THA-peers.
B. Certificateless public key cryptography
In order to avoid the authentication of the public key, [11, 12, 16, 17, 18] introduced the notion of identitybased cryptography (IBC), which was to simplify key management and avoided the use of digital certificates. The corresponding private key is generated for the user by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG) and is given to the user through a secure channel.
In order to avoid the escrow problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson [13] invented a new paradigm called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). CL-PKC also uses a third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) to help a user to generate his secret key. However, the KGC only provides a partial private key for each user. The full private key is generated by the user who makes use of the partial private key obtained from the KGC and the secret information chosen by himself. Hence, CL-PKC removes the key escrow problem. The public key of the user is computed from the KGC's public parameters and his secret information, and is published by the user himself.
A more recent work [19] thoroughly investigated the connections between the CLE and CBE scheme. The paper [20] describes a somewhat similar scheme to [19] , another work [21] that investigates identity-based and certificateless extensions of key encapsulation mechanisms. Huang et al. [22] pointed out a security drawback of the primal CLS scheme and defined the security model of CLS schemes. Zhang et al. [23] and Hu et al. [24] improved the security model of CLS schemes and presented a more efficient CLS scheme. A new kind of Type II attack-'Malicious but Passive KGC attack' is introduced in [25] . In the new attack, the KGC is assumed malicious at the very beginning of the Setup stage of the system.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Overview of pairings and bilinear problems
We briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps and bilinear map groups. We consider two groups G 1 (additive) and G 2 (multiplicative) of the same prime order q. P is the generator of G 1 . A bilinear map is a map 2 1 1 :
satisfying the following properties:
can be computed efficiently. :
B. Complexity assumptions
. Formally, the output of
C. Binding technique
In the original construction of CL-PKE in [15] , it is assumed that the KGC is trusted and issues only one copy of each partial key to each entity. Additionally, the partial key D A should be transmitted to entity A confidentially and authentically. An alternative technique called "Binding technique" is discussed in [26] . The main idea is that the entity A must first fix its secret value and its public key P A . Then the KGC binds entity A's pubic key with entity A's identity ID A to generate A's partial key D A . A very important benefit is, with the binding technique, the partial key needs not to be kept secret.
D. Framework of certificateless encryption scheme
 Setup, This algorithm is run by the KGC that accepts as input a security parameter s to generate a master-key and a list of system parameters params.  SetSecretKey, the secret value setup algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list params and a user identity id. It returns the user id's secret value x ID .  SetPublicKey, the public key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list params, a user identity id, and the user id's secret value x ID . It returns the user id's public key O ID .  PartialPrivateKeyExtract, the partial private key issuance algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a user identity id, a parameter list params, a master key s, and public key O ID . It returns the user's partial private key D ID .  SetPrivateKey, the private key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list params, the user id's partial private key D ID , and the user id's secret value x ID . It returns the user id's private key S ID .  Encrypt, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a message M, a user identity id, a parameter list params, and the user's public key O ID . Encrypt returns a ciphertext C.  Decrypt, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list params, the decryption key S ID , and a ciphertext C. Decrypt returns a message M or the special symbol ⊥.
E. Security model
Here we provide a list of the actions that a general adversary against a CL-PKE scheme may carry out and a discussion of how each action should be handled by the challenger for that adversary. A of its choice. Note that it is unreasonable for A to issue partial key query, complete decryption key query, corrupted decryption servers' key share query, or decryption query, on an entity A whose public key has been replaced. Hence, there are two types of adversaries namely Type I adversary and Type II adversary with different capabilities in CL-PKC.
A Type I adversary does not access the KGC's master key but can replace public keys of arbitrary identities with other public keys of her choosing. Such an adversarial behavior seems natural as, in the absence of digital certificates, anyone can alter public directories by replacing public keys without being caught or detected. As attackers against IBE schemes, Type I adversaries can also obtain partial and full private keys of arbitrary identities.
A Type II adversary can get the KGC's master key and may still obtain full private keys for arbitrary identities but is disallowed to replace public keys during the game.
Chosen ciphertext security for CL-PKE: We say that a CL-PKE scheme is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack ("IND-CCA secure") if no polynomially bounded adversary A of Type I or Type II has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:  Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives A the resulting system parameters params. If A is of Type I, then the challenger keeps master-key to itself, otherwise, it gives master-key to A.
 Phase 1:
A issues a sequence of requests, each request being either a partial private key extraction, a private key extraction, a request for a public key, a replace public key command or a decryption query for a particular entity. These queries may be asked adaptively, but are subject to the rules on adversary behaviors defined above.  Challenge Phase: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs the challenge identity ID * and two equal length plaintexts M 0 ,M 1 ∈ M. Again, the adversarial constraints given above apply. In particular, ID * cannot be an identity for which the private key has been extracted. Moreover, if A is of Type I, then ID * cannot be an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key extracted. The challenger now picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes C * , the encryption of M b under the current public key P * for ID * . If the output of the encryption is ⊥ , then A has immediately lost the game (it has replaced a public key with one not having the correct form). Otherwise, C * is delivered to A.  Phase 2: A issues a second sequence of requests as in Phase 1, again subject to the rules on adversary behaviors above. In particular, no private key extraction on ID * is allowed, and, if A is of Type I, then the partial private key for ID * cannot be extracted if the corresponding public key was replaced in Phase 1. Moreover, no decryption query can be made on the challenge ciphertext C * for the combination of identity ID * and public key P * that was used to encrypt M b . 
IV. CERTIFICATELESS PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEME
A. CL-PKC Schemem Construction
The Scheme is as follows: Setup: Run by the KGC. Given a security parameter k, the KGC outputs two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q(>2 k ), an admissible bilinear map
and chooses four hash functions:
Then the system's public parameters are: 
B. Security Proof
Theorem 1: Our CL-PKC scheme is secure against a type I adversary in the random oracle model assuming the GBDH and 4-BDH problem is intractable.
Proof: Let C be a GBDH and 4-BDH attacker who receives a random instance (P, aP, bP,cP) of the GBDH problem in G 1 and a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP, abP, acP, bcP, dP) of the 4-BDH problem in G 1 . A I is a type I adversary who interacts with C as modeled in Game. We show how C can use A I to solve the GBDH and 4-BDH problem. C sets P 0 = sP, selects params = (G 1 , G 2 Proof: Let C be a CDH and GBDH attacker who receives a random instance (P, sP, bP) of the CDH problem in G 1 and a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP) of the GBDH problem in G 1 . A II is a type II adversary who interacts with C as modeled in Game. We show how C can use A II to solve the CDH and GBDH problem. C sets P 0 = sP, selects params = (G 1 , G 2 
4) Reply:
On receiving a trust query for Peer A, its THA peer, say Peer i can generate a reply and send it back to the querying Peer B. The goal of this message is to ensure that the querying peer can identify it to be generated by a THA peer and that it has not been tampered with enroute. The reply message looks like: 
A. Manipulating Reply Messages
This can be attempted by either a malicious THA peer or a non-THA peer.
THA peer: A THA peer can send a wrong trust value in the reply. To prevent this, the KGC assigns a number of THA peers for a single peer. Then the querying peer can take a majority vote amongst them and select that value. Since the assignment of THA peers is random, there is extremely small possibility of majority of peers being malicious and co-operative, thus making the above mechanism secure.
Non-THA peer: It can either attempt to replay a genuine reply message at a later time or try and use a fake pair of <THA_S, THA_O> THA keys. The former scenario is prevented by including TS in the reply message. Any message older than a user-decided window is disregarded. The latter scenario can be also easily prevented by the certificateless public key cryptography scheme. The malicious peers can generate a valid THA public key. But he can not generate THA private key without the KGC.
B. Manipulating Proof-of-Interaction Message
A proof-of-interaction message can be manipulated either by attempting to replay an old message or by using a fake pair of <S A , O A > keys. The replay is avoided by the use of TS. Any report message, containing the proofof-interaction message outside a reasonable time frame, is discarded. The other possibility is that a peer uses a fake pair of <S A , O A > keys. Note that it is not possible for an offering peer to fake, since its THA peer would have included its true O A value in the reply message. To prevent the querying peer from faking, the offering peer can also get its actual public key from its THA peer.
C. Manipulating Report Message
There is very little that can be done to manipulate a report message. As mentioned earlier, no peer can fake a report message and also that it is secure in the sense that only the THA peer can read the message. Only possibility is that a peer can rate another peer in a wrong manner, e.g., giving a poor rating in despite of good performance. This is tackled on the trust model level. Any good trust model will not affect a peer's trust rating because of a single peer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Trust data sharing is the important part of trust model. In this paper we have described the design of a secure underlying protocol for trust data sharing. Based on the Certificateless Public Key Cryptography Scheme, the protocol provides secure, reliable, and accountable distribution and access of ratings of peers. We have also presented a thorough security analysis of the protocol and reported some initial experimental results, showing that the protocol has desirable features of reliability, accountability and is secure in the presence of a variety of possible attacks.
